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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The lower Court found that Memory Technologies, lnc( MTI) signed a contract 
with Directories (which contract was assigned to ERS) on October 13, 2001 and that MTI, was a 
Utah Corporation in good standing at that time. Rice was authorized to enter into contracts on 
behalf of MTI. (Findings % 1& 2). 
2. The contract involved advertising Directories was to provide for MTI. (Findings ^ 
1.) A dispute arose regarding the advertising, and MTI refused to pay. The Court found money 
was due to Directories/ ERS under the contract. The contract was the basis for the debt. 
(Findings Ifl] 6-8, Conclusions |^ 6). 
3. At the time that this action was commenced against Rice , MTI had been 
administratively dissolved by the Department of Commerce for allowing the corporate status to 
expire. (Findings |^ 10). 
4. At the time of trial MTI had been reinstated and was valid corporation. (Findings 
paragraph 11). 
5. The contract signed by Rice as President of MTI contained a provision at 
paragraph 11, which states: 
If Advertiser sells or discontinues business, no payment or amount 
due under the terms of the contract will be waived thereby. The 
signer of the contract guarantees payment of the amount due either 
directly or through escrow if the business is sold. Payment or 
1 
amount due may be assumed by the New Owner, if name of 
business and phone number remains the same. 
(Findings m 13-14). 
6. The District Court found, solely based on the administrative suspension of MTI 
after the signing of the contract, that MTI had "discontinued" business and that Rice was 
therefore personally liable for the debt solely under the contractual provision described above. 
(Findings 12, 13 and 14; Conclusions 3, 4 and 5). 
7. The personal liability of Rice is based upon undisputed facts is the only issue on 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RICE SIGNED THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE AS PRESIDENT OF MTL A 
VALID UTAH CORPORATION 
The Appellee, ERS, attempts to argue an issue that is beyond the scope of the issues 
presented by Rice's appeal, and is in direct conflict with a Finding of the lower Court which 
finding has not been disputed by either party. In this argument ERS claims that Rice is 
personally liable under the contract because he signed on behalf of MTI, and MTI was not an 
existing entity so Rice in reality signed personally. This argument should be disregarded for two 
reasons. 
First, this issue was not raised by Rice, and is beyond the scope of this appeal. The 
issues on this appeal do not include any reference to whether or not MTI (or Memory 
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Technologies, Inc ) was a valid corporation at the time the contract was signed. The fact that Rice 
signed as president of a valid corporation is undisputed for purposes of appeal. Even if the issue 
had been properly riased by ERS in this appeal, in order to dispute these findings by the lower 
Court, ERS would be required to marshal the facts and show that the lower Court's findings are 
not supported by the evidence. Harding v. Bell 57 P.3d 1093,1096-1098 (Utah 2002). This ERS 
has not and canncU \\\ \ Nothing in the trial record supports such a claim. 
Second, ERS' argument admits that it is contrary to the Findings of Fact made by the Trial 
Court which were prepared by ERS, counsel. These findings specificalK stair 
1. The Court finds that Phone Directories Company, Inc. ( Directories) and Memory 
Technologies, Inc. (MTI) entered into a written advertising contract.... 
2. The Court finds that at the time the contract was signed, October 13, 2001, that 
MTI was an active Utah Corporation and that Scott Rice was an individual 
authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of MTI.. 
Findings paragraphs 1&2. 
ERS' argument directly flies in the face of these unchallenged findings and should not 
be considered as part of this appeal. Rice signed the contract at issue as an agent of a valid 
corporation. Whether oi nil he is personally liable hinges on the correct interpretation of the 
contract. There is simply no basis in this appeal to question the status of the corporation at the 
time the contract was signed. 
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II. RICE IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER A 
CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE § 16- 10a-1421 
AND 1422, FOR A CORPORATE DEBT. 
Rice cannot be liable for the contract debt unless the contract so provides. Appellee 
appears to be arguing that because the corporation was dissolved Rice somehow becomes liable 
for a debt that was incurred while the corporation was active, under Utah Code Annotated §16-
10a-1422, simply because the suit to enforce the debt was brought during the time of when the 
corporation was administratively dissolved. This is a misapplication of the law and if followed 
would be a disastrous public policy. The point in time that is key to determining a corporate 
officer's personal liability is when the debt arose, not when the suit is brought. This debt arose in 
2001 when MTI was an active corporation, not when it was administratively dissolved. 
Rice did not incur debt on behalf of the corporation after it was administratively 
dissolved as was the circumstance in Lents v. Borstad, 445 P.2d 597( Oregon 1968), cited by 
ERS. In Lents the corporate officer was found personally liable based on acts he committed 
during the period of time in which the corporation was dissolved. In the present case there is no 
evidence Rice did anything on behalf MTI when it was administratively dissolved. Lents does not 
stand for the proposition that one who acted on behalf of a valid corporation becomes personally 
liable for the corporate debts if at some time later a clerical error results in the administrative 
dissolution of the corporation. If such a rule were adopted, the corporate shield for debts incurred 
years before the clerical error would be rendered meaningless in every instance where some one 
simply overlooks the corporate renewal, but corrects the error within the grace period provided 
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by statute. Such cannot be the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Rice is not personally liable for the debt owed to Appellee. The contract giving rise to 
the debt does not create personal liability on the part of Rice. Even if the contract could be 
interpreted in some instances to create such liability, the events that would trigger such liability 
did not occur simply because an administrative dissolution occurred after the debt was incurred 
and was timely cured before trial. This Court should reverse the lower Court and dismiss the case 
as to Rice. 
DATED this the 17th day of June. 
ATKIN & SHIELDS, P.C. 
A/ 
Blake S. Atkin 
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